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-1STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS1
Amicus Curiae adopts the statements of the case and facts as set forth by
defendants in State v. Bennett, No. 406P18, and State v. Hobbs, No. 263PA18.
STATEMENT OF INTEREST
The identity and interest of Amicus Curiae is set forth in the Motion for
Leave to File Amicus Curaie Brief, filed with this proposed amicus brief.
INTRODUCTION
In Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the United States Supreme Court
spelled out one available procedural framework for addressing race discrimination
in jury selection, but invited states to supplement or modify that framework as
appropriate. In 2018, the Washington State Supreme Court took up that invitation,
first by adopting a court rule that applied prospectively, and then through a court
decision that constitutionalized a portion of that court rule. The court grounded the
rule and decision in its acknowledgment that explicit and implicit or unconscious
bias were improperly affecting jury selection in Washington, that Batson
imperfectly addressed explicit bias, and that the Batson framework was wholly
incapable of addressing implicit bias.
The instant cases present the opportunity for this Court to take steps similar
to its sister court in Washington. The Court should acknowledge that both explicit

Pursuant to N.C. R. App. P. 28(i)(2), Amicus states that no person or entity other
than Amicus Curiae, its members, or its counsel, directly or indirectly, either wrote
the brief or contributed money for its preparation.
1

-2and implicit bias taint jury selection in North Carolina, and that the default Batson
framework imperfectly addresses explicit bias and entirely fails to address implicit
bias. Under North Carolina law, and as allowed under Batson, this Court has the
power to prescribe modifications similar to those the Washington Supreme Court
adopted, to enforce the constitutional rights of both North Carolina litigants and
citizens who fulfill their civic duty by answering the call to jury service.
The rights of North Carolinians can be properly safeguarded if this Court
adopts two key reforms from Washington State: First, trial courts should review
and adjudicate the validity of a peremptory strike whenever a genuine concern over
racial bias is presented. Second, a peremptory should be disallowed whenever,
under the totality of circumstances, an objective observer could view race as a factor
in the strike. Under this modified framework, peremptories are disallowed if a
genuine concern over racial discrimination is present, unless the court can say with
confidence that racial bias is not at play. This rebalanced approach acknowledges
the pervasiveness of racial bias and prioritizes remedying racial discrimination in
jury selection over allowing a given peremptory challenge against a qualified juror.
ARGUMENT
I. RACIAL DISPARITY EXISTS IN NORTH CAROLINA’S CRIMINAL
JUSTICE SYSTEM, INCLUDING WITH REGARD TO THE EXERCISE
OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES.
In 2010, bar leaders and scholars in this state formed a Task Force on Racial
and Ethnic Bias (“N.C. Task Force”) to consider available research and analyze the
influence of racial bias in North Carolina’s justice system. See N.C. Advocates for

-3Justice, History of the Task Force on Racial Bias, NCAJ.COM.2 This was a precursor
to the North Carolina Commission on Racial and Ethnic Disparities in the Criminal
Justice System (“NC-CRED”), comprised of prosecutors, defenders, academics,
advocates, and judges from this state—including a Justice of this Court. See NCCRED, About, NCRACIALJUSTICE.ORG (2015).3 Both esteemed bodies acknowledged
troubling signs of racial disparity across North Carolina’s criminal justice system.
See N.C. Task Force, Statement on Racial and Ethnic Bias in the Criminal Justice
System (citing studies)4 and Executive Summary (same)5; NC-CRED, About and
Projects, supra n.3. Such disparities culminate in a heightened rate of incarceration
for persons of color in this state, and especially for black North Carolinians, that far
outpaces the rate for whites. See, e.g., Prison Policy Initiative, North Carolina
profile, PRISONPOLICY.ORG (data charts showing black incarceration rate is almost
five times higher)6; NC-CRED, North Carolina Prison Population Figures and
Demographics (same)7; NC-CRED, About, supra n.3 (noting blacks make up 22% of
general population but 57% of prison population).
A growing body of nationwide research has shown an ongoing and sizeable
influence of racial bias, especially implicit bias, on criminal justice practices and
incarceration rates. This body of research was explored extensively in Washington
https://www.ncaj.com/index.cfm?pg=TaskForceHistory.
http://ncracialjustice.org/.
4 http://www.ncaj.com/docDownload/443353.
5 https://fbaum.unc.edu/papers/NCAJ_Exec_Summary.pdf.
6 https://www.prisonpolicy.org/profiles/NC.html.
7 http://ncracialjustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/North_Carolina_Prison
_Population_Figures_and_Demographics-7.png
2
3

-4State after it was reported in late 2010 that one of the Washington Supreme Court’s
justices, at a public conference and in response to concerns expressed about racial
disparity, stated that African Americans are “disproportionately represented in
prison because they have a crime problem” and that race discrimination played no
significant role. Steve Miletich, Two State Supreme Court Justices Stun Some
Listeners with Race Comments, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 21, 2010).8 This statement
prompted an ad hoc statewide Task Force on Race and the Criminal Justice System
to examine the available research and explore the causes of any race disparity in
the criminal justice system. The Task Force was comprised of numerous respected
organizations and institutions from across the state, including judicial and
executive agencies, prosecutor and defender associations, bar groups, law schools
and university departments, and community organizations.
The Task Force ultimately issued a comprehensive report (“Task Force
Report”) that it presented to the state supreme court on March 2, 2011, in a historic,
first-ever public symposium the court convened to explore these issues. See Task
Force, Prelim. Report on Race and Wash.’s Crim. Justice System (2011).9 As
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/two-state-supreme-court-justices-stunsome-listeners-with-race-comments/.
9 https://law.seattleu.edu/Documents/korematsu/race%20and%20criminal%20
justice/preliminary%20report_report_march_1_2011_public_cover.pdf, reprinted in
47 GONZ. L. REV. 251 (2011), 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 623 (2012), 87 WASH. L. REV. 1
(2012). The Washington Supreme Court has since held annual symposia on issues of
race and criminal justice. The next year’s topic was Juvenile Justice and Racial
Disproportionality, with the 2018 topic being “Legal Financial Obligations (LFOs):
Beyond Defining the Problem; Advancing Solutions.” Information about the annual
symposia, with video links, is available at https://www.courts.wa.gov/?fa=
home.sub&org=mjc&page=symposium&layout=2.
8

-5explained in the report, abundant research shows that individuals in our society
tend to associate people of color with criminality and to exhibit substantially
divergent behavior in experiments based on the manipulation of race, often without
awareness or acknowledgment race is playing any role, especially when neutral
justifications are available. See id. at 19, A-17 to A-18. The research further shows
race significantly influences decisions made throughout the criminal justice process,
such as decisions to investigate, arrest, find guilt, or impose a particular sentence.
See id. at 11-20, A-18 to A-20. This effect has also been shown in the use of
peremptory challenges in particular, with significant racial disparities
demonstrated in actual cases across a wide variety of states, in controlled
experiments, and confirmed in surveys of the bar and public. See, e.g., State v.
Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d 38, 43-45 (Wiggins, J., lead op.), 85-91 (González, J.,
concurring) (2013) (citing sources).
On the basis of this information, the Washington Supreme Court ultimately
took formal notice of the significant influence of implicit racial bias on criminal
justice and specifically on the use of peremptory challenges. See id. at 42-50 & n.1;
see also State v. Gregory, 192 Wash. 2d 1, 22 (2018) (acknowledging the court’s
“judicial notice of implicit and overt racial bias” in the criminal justice system). In
acknowledging these circumstances, the court aptly commented that it “would be
naïve to assume” a given state “is somehow immune” from such a prevalent,
nationwide problem. Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d at 45, 46-49. Indeed, a growing body
of research specific to North Carolina shows that the same problems exist in this

-6state. See, e.g., Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Targeting young men of color for
search and arrest during traffic stops: evidence from North Carolina, 2002-2013,
POLITICS, GROUPS, AND IDENTITIES (2016) (review of over 18 million traffic stops
finding “dramatic disparities” based on race that are “growing over time” with
“strong evidence” they resulted specifically from “racial bias”).10
The specific problem at issue in the instant cases is the well-established
widespread, ongoing, and material influence of racial bias on the use of peremptory
challenges to exclude prospective jurors. Abundant research confirms the
prevalence of this problem specifically in North Carolina. See, e.g., Francis X.
Flanagan, Race, Gender, and Juries: Evidence from North Carolina, 61 J. L. &
ECON. 189, 199-201 (2018) (finding racially biased peremptory usage in actual
North Carolina cases); Ronald F. Wright et al., The Jury Sunshine Project: Jury
Selection Data as a Political Issue, 2018 U. ILL. L. REV. 1407 (2018) (same);
Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, A Stubborn Legacy: The Overwhelming
Importance of Race in Jury Selection in 173 Post-Batson North Carolina Capital
Trials, 97 IOWA L. REV. 1531 (2012) (same); Mary Rose, The Peremptory Challenge
Accused of Race of Gender Discrimination? Some Data from One County, 23 L. &
HUM. BEHAV. 695 (1999) (same). This ongoing pattern of discrimination violates
constitutional rights, results in less diverse and less effective juries, and seriously
undermines the appearance of fairness. See Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d at 41-42, 4450, 85-91, 98-101; cf. State v. Cofield, 324 N.C. 452, 459 (1989) (noting heightened
10

https://fbaum.unc.edu/articles/PGI-2016-Targeting.pdf.

-7state constitutional protection of jurors against exclusion based on race is meant to
ensure the judicial system is “perceived to operate evenhandedly”).
The default Batson framework has not curbed this enduring problem in
North Carolina. Notwithstanding the evidence of ongoing and widespread racial
discrimination in the use of peremptories in this state, a recent review of appellate
decisions found that this Court and the North Carolina Court of Appeals have
almost never found racial discrimination in the use of a peremptory strike—and in
the only two cases acknowledging such discrimination, it was against white jurors.
See Daniel R. Pollitt & Brittany P. Warren, Thirty Years of Disappointment: North
Carolina’s Remarkable Appellate Batson Record, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1957 (2016). As the
Washington Supreme Court acknowledged in the face of similar data in that state,
Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d at 46, such a track record is “highly suggestive” that North
Carolina’s current framework is failing because it imposes too great an evidentiary
burden for the invalidation of a peremptory due to racial bias.
Based on the evidence of racial discrimination in North Carolina peremptory
usage and the lack of any meaningful remedy to date, this Court is now being called
upon in numerous pending cases to address this issue. In the instant cases, each
defendant has invited the Court to take this “opportunity to review and invigorate
its Batson jurisprudence” and “to instruct trial judges in the proper handling of such
challenges.” State v. Bennett, No. 406P18, Pet. for Disc. Rev. at 1, 11; see also State
v. Hobbs, No. 263PA18, Pet. for Disc. Rev. at 19. In other pending cases, this Court
has been specifically called upon to acknowledge the significant influence of implicit

-8bias on the criminal justice system, including in jury selection. See State v. Crump,
815 S.E.2d 415, 423-24 & n.2 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018), rev. granted, 820 S.E.2d 811;
State v. Robinson, No. 411A94, Br. of Amicus Curiae Professors Engaged in Implicit
Bias Research, 2013 WL 9047372 (Aug. 9, 2013). And in still other pending cases,
the parties have asked this Court to consider reforming the Batson framework,
pointing to Washington State as a model. See State v. Burke, No. 181A93-4, Def.App.’s Supp. Br., 2019 WL 944785, at *19-20 (Feb. 15, 2019); State v. Golphin, No.
441A98-4, Def.-App.’s Reply Br., 2019 WL 657458, at *22-23 (Feb. 1, 2019).
II. THIS COURT HAS AUTHORITY TO REMEDY AND PREVENT
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN NORTH CAROLINA JURY
SELECTION.
This Court is authorized under North Carolina and federal law to modify or
supplement the default Batson framework in furtherance of the administration of
justice and equality. As recognized in Batson, racial discrimination in jury selection
was declared unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment’s guaranty of
equal protection long ago. See 476 U.S. at 85 (citing Strauder v. W. Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880)). Yet the mere recognition of this constitutional principle was never
enough to ensure it was respected. See id. at 93. Over a century later, in the face of
continuing widespread race discrimination in the use of peremptory strikes, Batson
set forth a three-part, burden-shifting test to replace the “crippling burden of proof”
the Court had previously set for proving a racially motivated strike. Id. at 92.
In establishing its new test for eradicating racial discrimination in the use of
peremptories, the Supreme Court in Batson left each state free to supplement or
modify that framework within constitutional limits. The Court specifically

-9“decline[d]” to “formulate particular procedures to be followed,” recognized “the
variety of jury selection practices followed” in state trial courts, and expressly made
“no attempt to instruct these courts how best to implement” the Court’s holding. 476
U.S. at 99 & n.24. The Court has since emphasized that states “have flexibility in
formulating appropriate procedures to comply with Batson.” Johnson v. California,
545 U.S. 162, 168 (2005); see also Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 416 (1991) (noting it
“remains for trial courts to develop rules . . . to permit legitimate and well-founded
objections to the use of peremptory challenges as a mask for race prejudice”).
The flexibility each state has been afforded under Batson is consistent with
the Supreme Court’s “established practice” of “allowing the States wide discretion”
to “experiment with solutions” within constitutional limits, rather than dictating
“state rules of criminal procedure” or “imposing a single solution on the States from
the top down.” Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 272-75 (2000). When the Supreme
Court prescribes a procedural “framework” to “vindicate [a] constitutional right,” as
in Batson, that framework is “merely one method of satisfying” constitutional
requirements. Id. at 276. Each state remains authorized to “craft procedures that . .
. are superior to, or at least as good as,” the approved framework, so long as
equivalent “assurance” is provided that constitutional rights will be protected. Id. at
272, 276. This means any state is free to change its Batson procedures to be more—
but not less—protective against racial discrimination in jury selection. See, e.g.,
Johnson, 545 U.S. at 168 (invalidating heightened burden for prima facie case).
Under North Carolina law, this Court has two separate sources of authority

- 10 to supplement or modify this state’s Batson-related trial court procedures. First,
this Court is statutorily authorized to “prescribe rules of practice and procedure for
the superior and district courts supplementary to, and not inconsistent with, acts of
the General Assembly,” as a matter of policy. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-34; see also N.C.
Const. art. IV, § 13(2). This may include the announcement of a new or modified
procedural rule in the adjudication of a given case. See, e.g., State v. Hudson, 331
N.C. 122, 157-58 (1992) (noting Court adopted new sentencing rule in prior case
“pursuant to its powers to prescribe rules of practice and procedure under N.C.G.S.
§ 7A-34”); Peace v. Emp’t Sec. Comm’n, 349 N.C. 315, 328 (1998) (specifying
applicable burden of proof after noting that “[i]n the absence of state constitutional
or statutory direction, the appropriate burden of proof must be judicially allocated
on considerations of policy, fairness and common sense” (internal quotes omitted)).
In this instance, the General Assembly has merely provided for the general
use of peremptory challenges, without addressing Batson or specifying any
procedures to be followed to prevent racial discrimination as required under the
federal constitution. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 9-19, 15A-9. As such, this Court has
broad authority to prescribe appropriate procedures for overseeing the use of
peremptory strikes, including modifications to the judicially created Batson
framework currently followed in this state. And as reflected in Hudson, this Court
would be justified in exercising this authority to reform North Carolina’s current
Batson framework due to “practical concerns” that the framework is “unworkable”
and does not prevent “misuse.” 331 N.C. at 157-58 (internal quotations omitted).

- 11 Second, this Court has inherent authority to alter or supplement trial court
procedures to remedy ongoing constitutional violations. This Court’s “inherent
power” includes the “authority to do all things that are reasonably necessary for the
proper administration of justice.” Beard v. N. Carolina State Bar, 320 N.C. 126, 129
(1987). Further, under the North Carolina constitution, it is the specific and avowed
duty of this Court “to provide a forum for individuals claiming that procedural rules
abridge [constitutional] rights.” Simeon v. Hardin, 339 N.C. 358, 373 (1994) (citing
N.C. Const. art. IV, § 13(2)). In such cases, this Court has the “power to fashion an
appropriate remedy” depending on the circumstances, including the particular right
and procedures at issue. Id. (internal quotations omitted). This authority
supersedes any legislative or executive power or enactment. See id.
Here, abundant research has shown that racial bias is tainting jury selection
in North Carolina on a broad and ongoing basis. See supra, at 6. This violates the
federal constitutional rights of both North Carolina litigants and citizens appearing
for jury service in such cases. See, e.g., Powers, 499 U.S. at 406 (discussing how the
constitutional rights of both litigants and jurors are violated when race influences
the use of peremptory challenges). It also violates the North Carolina constitution,
which specifically provides that “[n]o person shall be excluded from jury service on
account of . . . race, color . . . or national origin.” N.C. Const. art. IV, § 26. This
provision gives heightened protection to prospective jurors in order to ensure that
the judicial system operates “evenhandedly” and is “perceived to operate
evenhandedly.” Cofield, 324 N.C. at 459. North Carolina’s current approach to

- 12 peremptory challenges fails to meet these demands.
III.

THIS COURT SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE NATURE AND
SCOPE OF THE PROBLEM, INCLUDING IMPLICIT RACIAL
BIAS.

It is often said the first step toward solving any problem is to acknowledge it
exists. In Flowers v. Mississippi, the U.S. Supreme Court emphasized the need to
examine each peremptory strike “in the context of all the facts and circumstances”
that surround it. No. 17-9572, 2019 WL 2552489, at *16 (June 21, 2019). The facts
and circumstances in that particular case were so troubling, the Court was
compelled to say “[w]e cannot just look away.” Id. The very same should be true
here, where the broader range of relevant facts and circumstances shows that racial
disparity and implicit bias infect the use of peremptory challenges at a widespread
and systemic level throughout North Carolina. This Court should take notice of
these broader circumstances as an initial step, much like the Washington Supreme
Court did in Saintcalle, to inform and refine any reforms this Court adopts and to
enlighten any further proposals or arguments the Court receives going forward.
This type of acknowledgment is especially appropriate and important when the
Court is engaged in policymaking or rulemaking and assessing whether a judicial
standard is adequate to address a particular problem. See, e.g., Alford v. Shaw, 318
N.C. 289, 295, 306 (1986) (deciding scope of business judgment rule “from a
historical and economic as well as a legal perspective” and taking “judicial notice” of
recent growth in North Carolina’s population, commerce, and industry).
Here, there are three important circumstances this Court should formally
and expressly acknowledge at the outset to inform its approach to Batson and more

- 13 broadly. First, it is known that stark racial disparity exists across North Carolina’s
justice system. See, e.g., NC-CRED, North Carolina Prison Population Figures and
Demographics, supra n.7 (data showing extremely disparate incarceration rates);
NC-CRED, Jury Pool Information Project11 (reporting that North Carolina jury
pools are 81% white though whites make up only 64% of the population). While
disparities do not prove discrimination on their own, they are highly suggestive and
call out for study, explanation, and reform. See, e.g., NC-CRED, About, supra n.3.
Second, it is known that race has an ongoing, widespread, and significant
influence on the use of peremptory strikes both nationally and specifically in North
Carolina. See, e.g., Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d at 43-46, 48-49, 53-55 (Wiggins, J., lead
op.), 85-91 (González, J., concurring) (cataloguing research and data); supra at 6
(numerous studies on North Carolina jury selection); e.g., Grosso, supra, 97 IOWA L.
REV. at 1542-43, 1548 (finding that even after controlling for numerous race-neutral
factors, North Carolina prosecutors in capital cases still peremptorily removed black
jurors at a rate 2.48 times greater than other jurors).
Third and finally, it is known that implicit racial bias has a significant and
widespread influence on decision-making, including in legal proceedings and on the
use of peremptories, and thus materially contributes to these known disparities.
See, e.g., NC-CRED, Implicit Bias Project12 (explaining that “brain science is
revolutionizing the way we think about racial disparities and racism” and that
“[n]ew scientific research is documenting that we all are influenced by []
11
12

http://ncracialjustice.org/projects/jury-pool-information/
http://ncracialjustice.org/projects/implicit-bias-trainings/

- 14 unconscious biases and that they can dictate our behavior without our approval or
awareness”); Task Force Report, supra n.9, at 19 (noting it has been “confirmed by
hundreds of articles in peer-reviewed scientific journals” that implicit racial biases
are both “pervasive” and “large in magnitude,” and “we are not, on average or
generally, cognitively colorblind” (internal marks and quotes omitted)); Saintcalle,
178 Wash. 2d at 46-49 (acknowledging and discussing this body of research).
While the research on implicit bias is abundant, thorough, and compelling,
two examples provide immediate insight into this research and its implications for
the instant cases and more broadly. First, a 2010 episode of ABC’s hidden camera
show, What Would You Do?, captured people’s candid reactions to actors trying to
steal a bike in broad daylight in a public park—and in doing so, revealed how race
regularly affects people’s perception and behavior. See ABC, What Would You Do?
(May 7, 2010) (link below).13 In the episode, two similarly dressed actors, a white
man and a black man, individually made obvious attempts to break the lock on a
bike as people passed by. See id. at 0:01 to 3:37. For the most part, the white man
was left alone, whereas the black man was repeatedly confronted and challenged:

13

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ge7i60GuNRg.

- 15 See id. Perhaps the white actor was given the benefit of the doubt—maybe it was
his bike and he had lost his key or forgotten the combination. The black actor,
though, did not receive this benefit and instead suffered from the opposite
presumption: that he was trying to steal the bike. Many of these passers-by
presumably would have disclaimed that race had anything to do with their thinking
or conduct. But when all the interactions are viewed as a whole, it is undeniable
that race shaped the perceptions and behavior of the onlookers to a significant
degree. And whether this was the result of admitted bias, concealed conscious bias,
or unconscious bias, the outcome is the same: disparate treatment based on race.14
Second, a controlled experiment on the use of peremptory challenges shows
the staggering effect implicit racial bias has on jury selection in particular. See
Samuel R. Sommers & Michael I. Norton, Race-Based Judgments, Race-Neutral
Justifications: Experimental Examination of Peremptory Use and the Batson
Challenge Procedure, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 261 (2007). In this experiment—
replicated with attorneys, law students, and college students—subjects were given a
criminal trial scenario and two prospective juror profiles, and were then asked
which of the two jurors they would remove with a peremptory strike. See id. at 26667. The two profiles included a variety of sundry details, such as education history,
occupation, and views on particular issues. Id. at 265-66. Only one variable was
At least one federal judge shows this video to jurors to educate them about
implicit bias. See Jerry Kang et al., Implicit Bias in the Courtroom, 59 UCLA L.
REV. 1124, 1182 n.250 (2012). The final segment of the video presents the same
basic scenario, but with a white woman attempting to steal the bike, who is
repeatedly offered assistance. The implications of this or any other forms of gender
bias and its intersection with race are beyond the scope of this amicus brief.
14

- 16 manipulated: race. In one condition, Juror 1 was depicted as white and Juror 2 as
black; in the other condition, their races were flipped, but all other details remained
the same. Id. at 266. As seen in the below chart, the strike rates were dramatically
different in the two conditions, with a strong bias shown against the prospective
black juror—that is, whichever profile happened to be depicted as black:

Id. at 267. The experimenters observed that these results “are strikingly similar in
direction as well as magnitude to conclusions of archival analyses of real
peremptory use.” Id. at 269. While these results are unsettling, they are
unsurprising—once one acknowledges and appreciates the prevalence and
significance of implicit racial bias on decision-making.
An especially troubling aspect of implicit racial bias crystallized in these
experiments is that it is extremely difficult to identify the influence of such bias on
a case-by-case basis. Take the peremptory experiment: On the whole, the influence
of race is obvious. But when asked to identify the reasons for their choice, subjects
overwhelmingly pointed to race-neutral aspects of the profiles, such as “familiarity
with police misconduct” or “skepticism about statistics,” rather than race. Id. at

- 17 267-68. And as the experimenters acknowledged, they could not say whether any
given test subject was influenced by race, only that race played a major role overall:
We observed bias against Black venire members only when examining
decisions made by several participants; indeed, for any given
participant, we are unable to determine whether the peremptory was
influenced by race or whether the justification provided was valid.
Only in the aggregate does evidence of racial bias emerge . . . .
Id. at 269. In these circumstances, precise case-by-case evaluation remains
unattainable regardless of whether racial bias is conscious but concealed, or
unconscious. In either form, the influence of such bias on a particular peremptory
strike remains unobservable, while its effect across all cases is significant and
widespread. The challenge is what to do about it.
This Court ought not to look away from these known facts and circumstances,
especially not for purposes of its own rulemaking. Instead, it should expressly
acknowledge and address them. They provide the context needed to determine if the
default Batson framework can adequately address the problem of racial
discrimination in jury selection that exists in North Carolina. They show that an
effective solution must account for overt, concealed, and unconscious bias. And they
underscore the urgent need to address race discrimination in jury selection to
ensure litigants receive fair trials and to vindicate the rights of North Carolina
citizens who have answered the call to fulfill their civic duties through jury service.
As occurred in Washington, formally and expressly acknowledging these known
facts as an initial step will not only help inform the Court on how best to proceed, it
will also ensure that further arguments and proposals the Court receives in this
and related contexts will be properly focused, informed, and responsive to the

- 18 widespread and undeniable problem the Court is confronting.
IV.

THIS COURT SHOULD ADOPT KEY REFORMS FROM
WASHINGTON STATE TO ADDRESS RACIAL DISCRIMINATION
IN NORTH CAROLINA JURY SELECTION.
Once this Court acknowledges the problem of both explicit and implicit racial

bias resulting in the widespread and ongoing exclusion of jurors based on race, the
question remains how best to tackle it. After confronting and acknowledging the
substantial evidence of racial disparities and implicit racial bias, the Washington
Supreme Court opted to depart from the U.S. Supreme Court’s long, failed history of
incremental reform in this area. See Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d at 43-46, 53-54
(acknowledging need for change); Wash. General Rule 37, Jury Selection (“GR 37”)
(establishing alternative framework)15; State v. Jefferson, 192 Wash. 2d 225 (2018)
(incorporating core standard of alternative framework as a constitutional test for all
pending cases). This Court should follow suit.
As recognized in Jefferson, the key issue here—and the central failings of
Batson—is the applicable burden of proof. 192 Wash. 2d at 242-43 (“(1) Batson
makes ‘it very difficult for defendants to prove [purposeful] discrimination even
where it almost certain exists’ and (2) Batson fails to address peremptory strikes
due to implicit or unconscious bias, as opposed to purposeful race discrimination”)
(footnotes omitted). To overcome racial discrimination in jury selection, including
concealed or unconscious bias, the burden of proof to invalidate a peremptory strike
must change drastically from the default approach. A definitive or even persuasive
https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20Orders/
GR37.pdf.
15

- 19 showing of race discrimination cannot be required, because in any given case, such
discrimination is too easily concealed and too difficult to identify or prove for such
an approach to work. Id.; see also supra, at 14-17.
When “the appropriate burden of proof” on an issue is “judicially allocated,”
as here, it should be based on “considerations of policy, fairness and common sense.”
Peace, 349 N.C. at 328. While objectors traditionally have been required to
affirmatively prove race discrimination to vindicate their constitutional rights, this
has simply been a matter of judicial fiat rather than positive law and is subject to
change. See, e.g., State v. Hough, 299 N.C. 245, 249 (1980); Miller v. State, 237 N.C.
29, 47 (1953); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398, 400 (1945). As this Court has
acknowledged, a special “presumption of [race] discrimination” may be warranted in
a given context for the protection of constitutional rights, especially when a
“procedure is susceptible of abuse,” as here. Hough, 299 N.C. at 250. Ultimately, the
chosen standard is supposed to “reflect the value society places” on the “interest
sought to be protected.” Peace, 349 N.C. at 327.
Here, a comparison of relative interests and values confirms that a drastic
shift in the applicable burden of proof is warranted. Race discrimination in the use
of peremptories delegitimizes the judicial process, wrongfully excludes citizens from
one of the two key avenues of direct participation in government—jury service and
voting—and denigrates the excluded jurors. See, e.g., Powers, 499 U.S. at 406-09. It
results in less diverse and thus less effective and fair juries. See Saintcalle, 178
Wash. 2d at 49-50. It entrenches the under-representation of minority groups, with

- 20 each strike against a minority juror having an especially detrimental effect given
the overall pool of potential replacements. See id. at 100 (González, J., concurring);
NC-CRED, Jury Pool Information, supra n.11 (noting North Carolina jury pools are
overwhelmingly white). For the excluded groups, this engenders distrust of the legal
system and thwarts the role of the jury as an intended check on potential
governmental abuse. See Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d at 100 (González, J., concurring);
Powers, 499 U.S. at 406. Finally, all of this seriously impairs public trust and
confidence in the judicial system, which is rightfully assigned primary importance
in North Carolina. See Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d at 106; Cofield, 324 N.C. at 459.
On the other side of the equation, the value of any given peremptory
challenge is highly doubtful, minimal at best, and should easily give way in the face
of genuine concerns about racial bias. To begin with, any given strike merely
concerns whether one juror, whom a neutral judge has deemed fit to serve, will
participate in a group deliberation process. Furthermore, studies of actual
peremptory usage and laboratory experiments both have shown that “attorneys
generally are ineffective” at identifying unfavorable jurors when exercising
peremptories, notwithstanding some misplaced confidence. See Saintcalle, 178
Wash. 2d at 103-04 (González, J., concurring) (discussing studies). No systemic
benefits from the use of peremptories have been substantiated, and at the very
least, any such benefits are flimsy in comparison to the grave harms of race
discrimination. See id. at 102-08. In sum, the minimal value of peremptory strikes
pales in comparison to expunging racial bias from jury selection.

- 21 Recognizing the need for a drastic reform, the Washington Supreme Court
adopted a new rule that flips the default Batson framework on its head, presuming
racial bias is involved whenever there are plausible indicators to that effect, and in
those cases, requiring proof that race is not a factor to salvage the peremptory
strike. While the entirety of Washington’s new rule warrants adoption, there are
two core elements to the rule that accomplish this important and needed shift:
minimalizing the prima facie case requirement and adopting an “objective observer
could view” standard. Each of these core elements is discussed below in further
detail for this Court’s consideration.
A. The validity of a peremptory challenge should be adjudicated
whenever a genuine concern over racial bias is presented.
The first core element of Washington’s rule is to minimize the first step of the
default Batson framework requiring a “prima facie case.” This step has materially
thwarted meaningful review of peremptory strikes without justification, largely
because of confusion about what actually qualifies as a prima facie case of race
discrimination. See, e.g., Saintcalle, 178 Wash. 2d at 96 (González, J., concurring).
While the U.S. Supreme Court has spelled out that this burden is intended to be
met “whenever the circumstances ‘permit the trial judge to draw an inference that
discrimination has occurred,’” and has emphasized that “trial courts should not be
engaging in needless and imperfect speculation when a direct answer can be
obtained by asking a simple question,’” many courts have nonetheless treated this
requirement as “more demanding” and highly discretionary. Id. (quoting Johnson,
545 U.S. at 170, 172, 173). Because this requirement has precluded the simple

- 22 disclosure of reasons and meaningful judicial review for racial bias even when
genuine concerns exist, it is harmful and should be abandoned.
Washington’s rule now broadly permits any party or the trial court to “raise
the issue of improper bias,” and in such cases, turns immediately to the exercising
party to disclose the actual reasons for the peremptory. GR 37(c)-(d). Given the
normal prohibitions against harassing or frivolous litigation conduct, the
importance of maintaining credibility with the trial court, and the fact that a
colloquy over the validity of the objection will follow, parties can be expected to
refrain from raising such an objection unless there are genuine reasons for concern.
And whenever such a concern exists, given the nature of the problem being
addressed and the relative interests at stake, meaningful review for racial bias is
appropriate. In the rare case when a party raises a frivolous or harassing objection,
it can be disposed of quickly and sanctions can be imposed as appropriate.
In practice, there are a variety of circumstances that could trigger a genuine
concern over racial bias in any given instance. One important factor, among others,
may be whether the struck juror is a member of a racial group that historically has
been subject to discrimination in jury selection, nationally or in the local
community. Other factors may arise from the particular dynamics of the case, the
jury pool, or voir dire proceedings, including the strength of the proffered reason for
the strike. Regardless, whenever a genuine concern over racial bias is presented,
the validity of the peremptory strike should be adjudicated.

- 23 B. Peremptory challenges should be disallowed whenever an
objective observer could view race as a factor.
The second core element of Washington’s rule is the ultimate standard for
reviewing suspect peremptory challenges: whether “an objective observer could view
race as a factor” in the strike. GR 37(e). The rule spells outs that “an objective
observer is aware that implicit, institutional, and unconscious biases, in addition to
purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair exclusion” of potential jurors.
GR 37(f). This standard is directly responsive to the key deficiencies the
Washington Supreme Court has explained about the default Batson framework: it
requires judges to accuse lawyers of racism, utterly fails to address implicit or
unconscious bias, and is too weak to capture most race discrimination. In contrast,
the “objective observer could view” standard allows for an impersonal inquiry,
incorporates the influence of unconscious bias, and demands the utmost degree of
confidence to sustain any suspect peremptory. In these ways, the standard properly
rebalances the Batson framework in favor of eradicating racial bias.
Courts in Washington and elsewhere have used this type of standard when
the circumstances demand it, for reasons that apply with special force here. As one
example, Washington courts apply a similar standard to determine whether to
grant a new trial when a jury has considered extrinsic evidence. See, e.g., Richards
v. Overlake Hops. Med. Ctr., 59 Wash. App. 266, 273 (1990) (conducting “an objective
inquiry” into “whether the extraneous evidence . . . could have affected the jury’s
determination” (emphasis in original)). Similarly, New Jersey courts apply a like
standard to determine whether a commercial license was properly revoked based on

- 24 a potentially corrupt relationship related to organized crime. See In re Pontoriero,
439 N.J. Super. 24, 41 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2015) (asking “whether a
reasonably objective observer could believe that [a known] criminal associate could
influence the licensee”). In each instance, an objective and stringent standard is
needed, whether because the court is barred from delving into the jury’s
deliberations but must still protect the integrity of the process, or because
corruption is so difficult to prove but important to eradicate for public confidence.
Here, an objective and stringent test is needed for similar reasons, given that the
court is practically barred from delving into a party’s or counsel’s unconscious
biases, and might be hesitant to make any direct accusations against them, but
must address the prevalent and problematic nature of racial bias in the use of
peremptories and the public appearance of racial inequity in jury selection.
When the “objective observer could view” standard is applied to a peremptory
strike, any genuine concerns about racial bias will usually invalidate the strike,
unless those concerns can be overcome with compelling evidence race played no role.
See, e.g., Jefferson, 192 Wash. 2d at 250-51. Overcoming the presumption in this
way will require a combination of an entirely persuasive justification for excluding
the juror—likely approaching the threshold of a challenge for cause—and the
absence of any distinctively questionable circumstances. Usually though, once there
are genuine concerns about racial bias, those concerns will persist, and the
peremptory will thus be denied.
The instant cases present no exception. In State v. Hobbs, for example, the

- 25 prosecutor used seven out of nine peremptories to remove black jurors, and when
the last of these strikes was challenged, the prosecutor gave eleven reasons for
striking that juror. 817 S.E.2d 779, 788 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018). In addition to the
implausibility of the sheer number of reasons given as actual reasons, many were
weak, vague, or uncorroborated. See id. (noting reasons included that juror “had left
several questions on the juror questionnaire unanswered,” “had given some
‘perplexing’ responses,” was “once singing ‘the sun will come out tomorrow’” when
walking out of court, and allegedly “nodded affirmatively” in response to another
juror’s statement). Regardless of the prosecutor’s other reasons and the other
circumstances surrounding the strike, the specter of racial bias remains, and the
peremptory should be deemed invalid.
CONCLUSION
Amicus urges the Court not to look away from what it knows—racial
disparities exist in North Carolina’s justice system; bias, explicit and implicit,
contributes to these disparities and affects the use of peremptory strikes; and the
Batson framework does a poor job of uncovering explicit bias and is wholly
incapable of redressing implicit bias. Amicus urges the Court to act more quickly
than did the Washington Supreme Court when it first acknowledged the scope of
the problem. This Court can act on the explicit authorization in Batson and the
abundant authority this Court has under the North Carolina constitution and
statutes to fashion an appropriate rule. Amicus suggests the approach taken by the
Washington Supreme Court as a roadmap, as it will accomplish what the current

- 26 Batson framework does not: safeguarding the constitutional rights both of litigants
and of North Carolina citizens who answer the call for jury service, and, in doing so,
restoring public confidence that the jury selection process in North Carolina is fair.
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